{"id":785,"date":"2026-05-14T22:34:44","date_gmt":"2026-05-14T15:34:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/talesofmotivations.com\/?p=785"},"modified":"2026-05-14T22:34:44","modified_gmt":"2026-05-14T15:34:44","slug":"the-warthog-refuses-to-die-why-is-the-us-air-force-cutting-half-its-a-10-fleet-but-refusing-to-kill-it-entirely","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/talesofmotivations.com\/?p=785","title":{"rendered":"THE WARTHOG REFUSES TO DIE – \u201cWHY IS THE US AIR FORCE CUTTING HALF ITS A-10 FLEET \u2014 BUT REFUSING TO KILL IT ENTIRELY?\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

THE WARTHOG REFUSES TO DIE<\/strong><\/h1>\n

A Three-Part Debate Story About the A-10, the F-35, Drone Warfare, and the Future of Close Air Support<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\n

Main Characters<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Professor Elias Morgan<\/strong>
\nA military aviation scientist and former aircraft survivability researcher. He believes the A-10 Thunderbolt II is old, slow, and unsuited for a future battlefield filled with advanced missiles, stealth fighters, artificial intelligence, and drones. To him, keeping the A-10 alive is emotional nostalgia disguised as strategy.<\/p>\n

Professor Helena Cross<\/strong>
\nA defense technology professor and former adviser on close air support doctrine. She believes the A-10 is old, yes, but not obsolete. To her, the Warthog has survived because it solves a problem no glamorous stealth fighter has fully replaced: cheap, rugged, persistent battlefield support.<\/p>\n

Setting<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Grand Hall of the International Airpower Symposium.<\/p>\n

Behind the speakers is a huge screen showing two aircraft.<\/p>\n

On one side: the sleek, angular F-35 Lightning II<\/strong>, dark and futuristic, almost alien.<\/p>\n

On the other: the blunt, scarred, ugly-beautiful A-10 Thunderbolt II<\/strong>, its famous cannon visible beneath its nose.<\/p>\n

Above them is a question:<\/p>\n

\u201cWHY IS THE US AIR FORCE CUTTING HALF ITS A-10 FLEET \u2014 BUT REFUSING TO KILL IT ENTIRELY?\u201d<\/strong><\/h2>\n

A crowd of pilots, engineers, soldiers, journalists, students, and military historians waits in silence.<\/p>\n

The moderator steps forward.<\/p>\n

\n

PART ONE: THE AIRPLANE THAT WOULD NOT DIE<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nLadies and gentlemen, tonight we discuss one of the strangest survival stories in modern military aviation: the A-10 Thunderbolt II, better known as the Warthog. For decades, the US Air Force has tried to retire it. For decades, it has survived. Now the Air Force is cutting the fleet dramatically, but still keeping a small number alive until around 2030. Why? Is this wisdom, weakness, politics, or proof that the old beast still has teeth?<\/p>\n

Professor Morgan looks at the A-10 image and smiles thinly.<\/p>\n

Professor Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 is not immortal. It is just very difficult to kill politically.<\/p>\n

Professor Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is a good opening insult. But it is incomplete.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIncomplete? Helena, the A-10 has been living on borrowed time for years. It is slow. It is non-stealthy. It was designed for a Cold War battlefield, not a sky full of modern surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare, and advanced fighters.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd yet, here we are, still debating it.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBecause people love it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. Because soldiers trust it.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is emotion.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nTrust earned in combat is not mere emotion.<\/p>\n

The crowd murmurs. Several old pilots in the back nod.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet me be blunt. The A-10 is a magnificent aircraft for a battlefield that no longer exists. It was built to destroy Soviet tanks pouring through Europe. It was designed to fly low, take punishment, and use that massive GAU-8 Avenger cannon to tear armored vehicles apart. That was its legend.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd legends do not appear from nothing.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nTrue. But legends can outlive their usefulness.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nSo can theories.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe future of airpower is stealth, networking, stand-off weapons, drones, artificial intelligence, and distributed targeting. The A-10 belongs to the age of pilots flying low and slow over the battlefield, close enough to see smoke and danger. That age is closing.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nClosing, perhaps. Closed, no.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThen explain why the Air Force is cutting the fleet nearly in half.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause the Air Force is trying to manage a transition. It wants to free money, pilots, maintainers, and infrastructure for newer aircraft. Nobody denies that. The A-10 fleet is old. Its wings, engines, avionics, and support systems require money. The Air Force does not want to preserve it forever.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBut the interesting part is not that the Air Force wants to cut it. The interesting part is that it still refuses to kill it entirely.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBecause Congress, pilots, and ground troops keep rescuing it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd because recent combat has reminded planners that old aircraft can find new missions.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou mean the anti-drone mission.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. The Warthog may no longer be the future of deep strike, but it may still be useful as a low-cost, persistent hunter of slow-moving drones, small boats, and battlefield threats in permissive or semi-permissive airspace.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a very narrow defense.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nSometimes narrow usefulness is still usefulness.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut should a modern air force keep an entire aircraft type alive for narrow usefulness?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIt depends on the cost of not having it.<\/p>\n

Morgan folds his arms.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nFine. Let us talk cost. The A-10 fleet is shrinking. The numbers tell the story. In this proposed structure, the total inventory drops from around 162 aircraft in 2025 to roughly 103 in 2026, and then to only 54 by 2027. Mission-ready aircraft fall from about 140 to 93 to around 45. That is not a revival. That is a controlled decline.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. But not an execution.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA delayed execution.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nOr a battlefield compromise.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou are making retirement sound like reincarnation.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd you are making transition sound like murder.<\/p>\n

The audience laughs.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe Air Force has been clear for years. It wants the F-35 and other platforms to take over missions once associated with the A-10. The F-35 can sense, connect, survive, and strike in contested airspace. It can share data with other aircraft, ships, ground systems, and command networks. That is the future.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe F-35 is extraordinary. But it is not a Warthog.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThank God.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat joke works until you are a soldier on the ground asking for close air support and the only aircraft overhead is too expensive, too fast, too maintenance-sensitive, or too limited in weapons load to spend hours hunting small threats.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is an old romantic image: the soldier calling for the A-10 like a guardian angel.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIt is old because it happened often enough to matter.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut future close air support will not work that way. It will be sensor-driven. Troops will request effects, not aircraft. A target may be serviced by a drone, artillery, missile, F-35, F-15EX, bomber, or loitering munition. The aircraft overhead will not need to be a flying tank.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is the dream.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt is the direction.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nDreams are clean. Battlefields are messy.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nAnd the A-10 is supposed to solve messiness?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nSometimes, yes. That is the entire point.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The First Big Question<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet me ask you directly, Helena. If you were building an air force from scratch today, would you design a new A-10?<\/p>\n

Cross pauses.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNot exactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan smiles.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThere it is.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nDo not celebrate too early. I would not design the same A-10 because technology has changed. But I might design something inspired by it: rugged, persistent, cheap to operate, heavily armed, optimized for lower-threat environments, able to hunt drones, support troops, strike small boats, and carry lots of low-cost weapons.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo not an A-10.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAn A-10 philosophy.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat sounds like nostalgia with a design office.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. It sounds like recognizing that not every war is fought against a first-class air defense network. Sometimes the enemy is launching cheap drones, fast boats, rockets, or militia attacks. Using million-dollar missiles and stealth fighters for every low-end threat is economically insane.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNow we are getting to the real issue: cost exchange.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou are saying the A-10 survives because the world has become full of cheap threats.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. Cheap drones have changed the math. If an enemy launches a low-cost one-way attack drone, and you shoot it down with a missile costing hundreds of thousands or more than a million dollars, you may win tactically but lose economically.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is true.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 carrying APKWS-guided rockets changes that equation. A guided rocket may cost tens of thousands, not millions. The aircraft can carry many of them. It can loiter. It can hunt slow-moving targets. It can defend bases, ships, troops, and facilities against drone threats without burning through high-end missile stocks.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is the strongest argument for keeping it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThen say it clearly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nFine. The A-10 may still have value as a budget air defense and battlefield support platform in permissive environments.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat was painful for you, I can tell.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nDeeply.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nGood.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

\n

PART TWO: THE WARTHOG FINDS A NEW WAR<\/strong><\/h1>\n

The screen changes.<\/p>\n

Now it shows an A-10 flying low over desert terrain, rocket pods under its wings. Beside it, a graphic appears: APKWS II \u2014 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nLet us turn to the A-10\u2019s new role. Recent operations have reportedly shown the aircraft\u2019s usefulness against drones and small maritime threats. Professor Cross, why does this matter?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause the A-10 has found a new job at the exact moment its old job was being declared dead.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat sounds poetic, but explain it technically.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nGladly. The A-10 was originally famous for close air support and tank killing. But now it is being used in ways that fit a new kind of conflict: drone hunting, maritime strike, base defense, convoy support, and combat search and rescue cover. It is not the best aircraft for every mission, but it is very good at staying around, carrying useful weapons, and operating in ugly environments.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nUgly environments, yes. Contested environments, no.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nImportant distinction. The A-10 should not be sent into dense modern air defenses. I am not arguing that. But not every airspace is dense with advanced missiles. There are gray zones, rear areas, maritime approaches, border regions, militia-threat areas, and drone corridors.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo you want the A-10 as a kind of armed patrol aircraft.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nPartly. A heavily armed, survivable, persistent patrol and support aircraft.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat sounds less glamorous than the legend.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nGood. Glamour kills budgets and pilots.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNow you sound like me.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nDo not insult me.<\/p>\n

The audience laughs again.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet us talk APKWS. This is where the A-10 argument becomes interesting. Hydra 70 rockets were once unguided. Add a laser-guidance kit, and now you have a precision weapon. Originally, this was mostly an air-to-ground tool. But adapted for air-to-air use against drones, it becomes a relatively cheap way to kill slow aerial targets.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 does not have an internal radar like a fighter. So it needs targeting pods, external data links, ground control, or other sensors to help find and identify drones.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nCorrect.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a limitation.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes, but not a fatal one. Modern warfare is networked. The A-10 does not need to discover every target alone. It can receive data from ground radars, other aircraft, ships, surveillance systems, or command networks. Once cued, it can use its targeting pod and laser-guided rockets to engage.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nAnd because a rocket pod can carry multiple rockets, one hardpoint gives it far more shots than a single air-to-air missile.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly. That is the flying magazine argument. A fighter carrying expensive missiles may run out quickly. An A-10 with rocket pods can carry many lower-cost interceptors for slower threats.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut the F-15E or F-15EX can also carry many munitions. Some concepts even allow multiple rocket pods on heavy aircraft.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. The A-10 is not the only possible APKWS truck. But it is already built, already rugged, already designed to loiter, and already good at low-altitude work.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou are arguing for practicality.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. The A-10 is not surviving because it is futuristic. It is surviving because certain problems are brutally practical.<\/p>\n

\n

The Drone Cost Trap<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet us discuss the cost-exchange problem. This is the nightmare facing modern militaries. If an enemy can build or buy one-way attack drones cheaply, and you intercept them with scarce, expensive missiles, you may be strategically drained.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly. You cannot defend a nation or military base forever by firing million-dollar weapons at cheap flying lawnmowers.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA brutal phrase, but accurate.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIt is not just about money. It is also about production. Advanced interceptors are hard to build. Patriot missiles, THAAD interceptors, AMRAAMs, naval interceptors \u2014 these are not simple items. If a conflict burns through them faster than factories can replace them, the arsenal becomes the battlefield.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a major lesson of modern war. Munitions stockpiles matter. Industrial capacity matters. The cheapest weapon that works may be strategically better than the most advanced weapon used unnecessarily.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd this is where the A-10 returns from the grave. It can carry relatively inexpensive weapons against relatively inexpensive threats. It can help save high-end missiles for high-end targets: fighters, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and advanced aircraft.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut would you really put an A-10 up against a large drone swarm?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNot alone.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThere it is.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo aircraft should face a swarm alone. The solution is layered defense: radar, jamming, guns, missiles, directed energy where available, drones, fighters, and aircraft like the A-10 carrying low-cost interceptors.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo the A-10 becomes one layer.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. That is a realistic role.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNot the star of the future battlefield.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. But not scrap metal either.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat may be the best summary of your argument.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThank you.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nI still dislike it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nI expected nothing less.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

\n

The \u201cGlass Cannon\u201d Debate<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The moderator leans forward.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nSome analysts describe the F-35 as a kind of \u201cglass cannon\u201d compared with the A-10. Is that fair?<\/p>\n

Morgan\u2019s eyes narrow.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt is catchy and misleading.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIt is emotionally effective, but technically incomplete.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nExplain.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA glass cannon is something powerful but fragile. The F-35 is not fragile in the simplistic sense. It survives by not being detected, by reducing enemy awareness, by using sensors and stealth to strike before being struck. Its survivability is not based on armor. It is based on information, signature management, electronic warfare, and tactics.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is true.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 survives differently. It has armor, redundant systems, widely spaced engines, manual reversion, and a design philosophy that expects damage. It is physically tough.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nVery tough.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut toughness is not the same thing as survivability against modern air defenses. A slow aircraft can be rugged and still be dead if placed in the wrong sky.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAgreed.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nProfessor Cross, then why does the glass cannon idea persist?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause people understand physical damage better than invisible survivability. If an A-10 comes home with holes in it, the story is obvious: \u201cThis aircraft is tough.\u201d If an F-35 avoids being targeted because of stealth and electronic warfare, there may be no dramatic picture. Survival without scars is harder to mythologize.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a very good point.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBut the F-35 also has vulnerabilities. Its stealth coating, sensors, and electronics are sophisticated. Damage that an A-10 might shrug off could be more expensive or mission-limiting for a stealth fighter. You do not want to use an F-35 as a low-altitude drone shooter if a cheaper, rougher tool can do it.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat I accept. Using F-35s for every low-end mission is like using a surgeon\u2019s scalpel to open a paint can.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut sometimes you need the scalpel.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAnd sometimes you need the paint can opened.<\/p>\n

The audience laughs.<\/p>\n

\n

The Ghost Stories of the Warthog<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The screen changes again.<\/p>\n

Now it shows battle-damaged A-10s.<\/p>\n

A hush falls over the room.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10\u2019s reputation is built partly on survival stories. Professor Cross, why do these stories matter?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause aircraft are not judged only by performance charts. They are judged by what happens when everything goes wrong.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 has extraordinary stories. I will grant that.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nCaptain Kim Campbell\u2019s 2003 incident is one of the most famous. Her A-10 was hit over Baghdad by a surface-to-air missile. The aircraft suffered severe tail and hydraulic damage. She had to use manual reversion, a mechanical backup system, and fly the damaged aircraft back to base with very limited control.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA remarkable feat of piloting.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nMore than remarkable. It shows the design philosophy of the aircraft. The A-10 expected damage. It had backups. It could be wrestled home.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut let us not confuse heroic survival with proof of future relevance. A knight surviving an arrow does not make armor superior to modern tactics.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nTrue. But survivability matters in the missions the A-10 still performs.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYes, in permissive or semi-permissive environments.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYou keep repeating that phrase as if I disagree.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBecause people listening may forget it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nFair.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10\u2019s survival stories are real. But they come from environments where it could still operate. Against modern integrated air defense systems, toughness may not be enough. A missile does not care about nostalgia.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo, but soldiers care about aircraft that stay overhead. That is the emotional core of the A-10 debate.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nEmotion again.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nDoctrine without human experience becomes sterile. Ask ground troops what they want overhead when they are pinned down. Many will say A-10, not because they read procurement tables, but because the aircraft became associated with presence, sound, and rescue.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe famous BRRRRT.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. The sound of the GAU-8 cannon became psychological warfare for the enemy and psychological comfort for friendly troops.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut sound is not strategy.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. But morale is not meaningless.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nI concede that.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nCareful, Elias. You are becoming reasonable.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nI will recover.<\/p>\n

\n

PART THREE: THE FUTURE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT<\/strong><\/h1>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The screen now shows a future battlefield.<\/p>\n

F-35s fly high and silent.
\nF-15EX aircraft carry large missile loads.
\nDrones orbit in packs.
\nGround troops mark targets with digital systems.
\nSatellites pass overhead.
\nA small A-10 silhouette appears at the edge of the image, almost like a ghost.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nNow we reach the central question. If the A-10 is being cut but not killed, what does that tell us about the future of close air support?<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt tells us the Air Force is caught between the past and the future.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nOr between theory and reality.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nFuture close air support will not depend on one aircraft type. It will be a network. Ground troops request an effect. Sensors identify targets. Artificial intelligence helps prioritize. The best available shooter responds: drone, artillery, missile, fighter, bomber, attack helicopter, or loitering munition.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is the vision.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt is more than a vision. It is already happening.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nPartly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe F-35 is central because it is not just a fighter. It is a sensor node. It can detect, classify, and share information. It can designate targets for other platforms. It can operate in places where an A-10 should never go.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. The F-35 is a better aircraft for contested airspace.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThen why hold onto the A-10?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause contested airspace is not the only airspace.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou keep returning to that.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause it is the point everyone forgets. A future war may have many zones. Some areas will be deadly to any non-stealth aircraft. Others will be messy but survivable. Some will involve drone attacks on bases. Some will involve militia groups. Some will involve maritime harassment. Some will involve search and rescue. Some will involve low-cost threats where using high-end assets is wasteful.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo you want an air force with high-low balance.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly. High-end stealth and networked aircraft for the hardest missions. Lower-cost, rugged, persistent aircraft for missions where stealth is unnecessary or wasteful.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut the A-10 is old. Even if your concept is right, why not replace it with a new platform?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is the painful question.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nAnswer it.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause the Air Force has never loved the A-10\u2019s mission enough to build a true successor.<\/p>\n

The audience reacts loudly.<\/p>\n

Morgan points at her.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNow that is the most important sentence of the night.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe Air Force loves air superiority, stealth, speed, strategic strike, and advanced technology. Close air support has always been politically and culturally complicated. The A-10 survived because ground troops valued it, Congress defended it, and no perfect replacement appeared.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo the A-10\u2019s survival is partly an indictment of planning.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou admit that?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nOf course. If the Air Force had developed a modern, affordable, survivable, persistent close-support and counter-drone platform, we might not be having this debate.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nInstead, we have a Cold War attack jet being repurposed to fight drones.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly. Strange? Yes. Useless? No.<\/p>\n

\n

The F-35 Question<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet us address the F-35 directly. Critics say it cannot replace the A-10 in close air support. I think that statement is too simple. The F-35 does not replace the A-10 by becoming the A-10. It replaces part of the mission by changing how the mission is done.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat is fair.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe F-35 can find targets, share data, coordinate strikes, survive in contested airspace, and pass targeting information to other shooters. It does not need to fly low and slow with a cannon to support ground troops.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIn a perfect network, yes.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nWhy do you say perfect network as if it is fantasy?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause networks fail. Links jam. Weather interferes. Troops move. Targets hide. Civilians appear. Friendly units get too close. Sometimes a pilot overhead, watching and talking directly with ground controllers, matters.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe F-35 can talk too.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes, but it carries fewer weapons for some CAS situations, has higher operating costs, and is more precious. Commanders may hesitate to use it for routine low-end support.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo you are not saying the F-35 cannot do CAS.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. I am saying it cannot economically and culturally replace everything the A-10 represents.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nCulturally?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes. Culture matters. Ground forces want aircraft that are available, responsive, persistent, and trusted. If a platform is too scarce, too expensive, or too tied to high-end missions, it may not feel available, even if technically capable.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a good distinction.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThank you.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nI hate that I keep saying that.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYou are growing.<\/p>\n

\n

The Unmanned Replacement<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nCould drones replace the A-10?<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nEventually, yes.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nEventually, perhaps. But not automatically.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nAn unmanned close air support aircraft could loiter for hours, carry precision weapons, avoid risking pilots, and operate in teams. In theory, it could do much of what the A-10 does at lower risk.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIn theory.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou dislike theory.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo, I dislike pretending theory has already passed its flight test.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA drone replacement could be rugged, cheap, modular, and persistent.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThen build it.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is what the future should do.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAgreed. But until then, the A-10 remains a bridge.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA bridge to what?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nTo a world where close air support is performed by a mix of drones, manned aircraft, artillery, missiles, and autonomous systems.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThen the A-10 is not the future.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. It is a useful survivor of the present.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is a modest defense.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nModest defenses are often more honest.<\/p>\n

\n

The Brutal Budget Question<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nLet me ask the question no one likes. Every dollar spent keeping the A-10 alive is a dollar not spent elsewhere. New aircraft, pilot training, drone systems, electronic warfare, missile production, base defense, cyber resilience. Is the Warthog worth the opportunity cost?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nOnly if its remaining squadrons perform missions that would otherwise consume more expensive resources.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nSo it must justify itself economically.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nAbsolutely.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNo sentimental protection?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNone.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNo keeping it alive because people love the sound of the cannon?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nNo museum-in-the-sky argument?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThen what is the standard?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nSimple: if the A-10 can perform real missions at lower cost, with acceptable risk, while preserving high-end assets and munitions for more dangerous threats, keep a small number. If it cannot, retire it.<\/p>\n

Morgan sits back.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is hard to attack.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause it is not romantic.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt is almost cold.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nGood strategy often is.<\/p>\n

\n

The Human Side<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The moderator\u2019s tone softens.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nBefore final statements, I want to ask about the human element. Why does this aircraft inspire such loyalty?<\/p>\n

Cross answers first.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBecause the A-10 was built around a promise: stay with the troops. It was not sleek. It was not glamorous. It was not designed to win beauty contests or dominate air shows. It was designed to appear when people on the ground were in trouble. That gives it a different emotional meaning.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nI agree. The A-10 is loved because it feels personal. Strategic bombers are abstract. Stealth fighters are mysterious. The A-10 is visible, audible, direct. Soldiers hear it. Enemies fear it. Pilots wrestle it. Maintainers patch it. It feels like a machine with scars.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat was almost poetic.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nDo not tell anyone.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nToo late.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut affection must not control force planning. Many beloved weapons become obsolete.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe horse was beloved. The battleship was beloved. The propeller fighter was beloved. Love does not stop missiles.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBut neither should fashion kill usefulness.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nMeaning?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nMilitaries sometimes chase the future so aggressively that they discard tools still useful in the present. The A-10 debate is not only about nostalgia. It is also about whether defense planners sometimes become embarrassed by simple, ugly, effective things.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nUgly effectiveness.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat should be the A-10\u2019s motto.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nIt practically is.<\/p>\n

\n

FINAL STATEMENTS<\/strong><\/h1>\n

The lights narrow on the two professors.<\/p>\n

The room grows quiet.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nProfessor Morgan, your final statement.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 Thunderbolt II deserves respect. It is one of the most iconic combat aircraft ever built. It protected troops, survived damage that would have killed other aircraft, and became a symbol of close air support. But respect is not the same as future relevance.<\/p>\n

He turns toward the screen.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe Air Force is cutting the fleet because the A-10 cannot survive in the most dangerous future battlefields. It lacks stealth. It lacks speed. It lacks the sensor fusion and networking of fifth-generation aircraft. Against advanced air defenses, it is vulnerable. The future belongs to systems that can operate across networks, share data instantly, use unmanned partners, and strike from stand-off distances.<\/p>\n

He pauses.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nBut the Air Force refuses to kill it entirely because the future has arrived unevenly. Cheap drones, militia threats, maritime swarms, and low-cost attacks have created missions where a rugged, heavily armed, persistent aircraft still makes sense. So the A-10 is not being saved as the future. It is being retained as a tool for the gaps the future has not yet filled.<\/p>\n

He looks at Cross.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nMy conclusion is simple: keep it only as long as it solves real problems better and cheaper than alternatives. Then let it go with honor.<\/p>\n

The audience applauds.<\/p>\n

Moderator:<\/strong>
\nProfessor Cross, your final statement.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe A-10 is old. No honest defender should deny that. It is not stealthy. It is not fast. It should not be thrown into advanced air defense networks. It is not a magical aircraft. It is not immortal.<\/p>\n

She leans forward.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nBut it is useful. And usefulness is the most underrated word in defense debates.<\/p>\n

The audience quiets.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe Warthog survives because war keeps producing ugly jobs. Drone hunting. Base defense. Close support in messy environments. Maritime strikes against small boats. Combat search and rescue cover. Low-cost attacks that should not be answered with million-dollar missiles. In those jobs, the A-10\u2019s persistence, weapons capacity, ruggedness, and operating logic still matter.<\/p>\n

She gestures toward the F-35 image.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThe F-35 is extraordinary. It represents the future of high-end air warfare. But the future is not made only of high-end threats. Sometimes the problem is a cheap drone, a militia convoy, a fast boat, or soldiers pinned down in dust and smoke. Sometimes the perfect answer is not the most advanced aircraft. Sometimes it is the aircraft already overhead, carrying the right weapon, at the right cost, with a pilot who knows how to stay.<\/p>\n

She pauses.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nSo why is the Air Force cutting half the A-10 fleet but refusing to kill it entirely? Because the Warthog is no longer central \u2014 but it is not yet useless. It is a bridge between the wars we planned for and the wars we actually face.<\/p>\n

The applause rises louder this time.<\/p>\n

\n

EPILOGUE: AFTER THE STAGE LIGHTS<\/strong><\/h1>\n

After the debate, the crowd slowly leaves. A few pilots remain near the stage, looking at the image of the A-10.<\/p>\n

Professor Morgan and Professor Cross stand alone beneath the screen.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nYou know it still has to die eventually.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nEverything does.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThat is cheerful.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nI am a defense professor. Cheerfulness is not my strongest subject.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nDo you think the last A-10 pilot will feel betrayed?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nNo. I think the last A-10 pilot will understand something others may not.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nWhat?<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nThat an aircraft does not need to live forever to have mattered.<\/p>\n

Morgan looks up at the Warthog\u2019s blunt nose and heavy cannon.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nIt is an ugly thing.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nYes.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nA very effective ugly thing.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nExactly.<\/p>\n

Morgan:<\/strong>
\nThe future will not be kind to aircraft like that.<\/p>\n

Cross:<\/strong>
\nMaybe not. But the present still has work for it.<\/p>\n

For a moment, neither speaks.<\/p>\n

On the screen, the F-35 looks like the future.<\/p>\n

The A-10 looks like a survivor.<\/p>\n

And between them lies the real problem of modern war:<\/p>\n

Not choosing old or new.
\nNot choosing stealth or armor.
\nNot choosing drones or pilots.
\nNot choosing beauty or brutality.<\/p>\n

But choosing the right tool before the wrong war begins.<\/p>\n

\n

Closing Reflection<\/strong><\/h1>\n

The A-10 is being cut because it is old, vulnerable in high-threat airspace, and expensive to maintain as a shrinking legacy fleet.<\/p>\n

But it is not being killed entirely because it still answers problems that modern war keeps producing:<\/p>\n

cheap drones,
\nsmall boats,
\nmilitia threats,
\nlow-cost attacks,
\nclose air support,
\ncombat rescue,
\nand the need to save expensive missiles for more dangerous enemies.<\/p>\n

The F-35 may represent the future of airpower.<\/p>\n

But the A-10 represents a stubborn lesson:<\/p>\n

Not every future problem requires the most futuristic solution.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sometimes the future arrives with stealth fighters and artificial intelligence.<\/p>\n

And sometimes it arrives as a slow drone that needs to be shot down cheaply.<\/p>\n

That is why the Warthog is being reduced, but not erased.<\/p>\n

It is no longer the king of close air support.<\/p>\n

But it is still the old beast standing at the edge of the runway, engines growling, cannon ready, refusing to die before its final mission is done.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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